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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AC  Community Animators (Animateur Communautaire)1 
ALIMA  Alliance for International Medical Action 
ANVE  National Association of Ebola Vanquishers (Association National des Vainqueurs d’Ebola) 
APS  Psycho-social assistant (Assistant Psycho-social) 
AT  Territorial Administrator (Administrateur du Territoire) 
CAC  Community outreach units (Cellule d’Animation Communautaire) 
CBO   Community-based organization 
CE  Community engagement 
CODESA  Local health committees (Comité de Développement de l'aire de Santé) 
DPS  Provisional health division (Division Provincial de Santé) 
EP  Protective equipment (équipement protective) 
ETC  Ebola Treatment Center 
EVD  Ebola Virus Disease 
FPIC  Free prior and informed consent 
INRB  National Institute of Biomedical Research (Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale) 
MPH   Ministry of Public Health 
MCZ  Medical Inspector of the Health Zone (Médecin Chef de Zone) 
MSF  Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) 
PA  Indigenous people (Peuple Autochtone) 
PBF  Performance-based financing 
PPE   Personal protective equipment 
RCCE  Risk communication and community engagement 
RECO  Community health workers (relais communautaire) 
SANRU  Rural Health Program (Projet Santé Rurale) 
SDB  Safe and dignified burial 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund 
USAID   United States Agency for International Development 
WHO  World Health Organization 
WFP  World Food Programme  
                                                          
1 The original French terms are written in italics and in parentheses. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This report is for supervisors managing ongoing Ebola outbreaks, or working on preparedness and 
recovery activities in regions at risk of, or affected by, Ebola epidemics. It is based on rapid and intensive 
ethnographic field research in Equateur Province, Democratic Republic of Congo, undertaken less than 
a month after the epidemic was declared over in July 2018. The research comprised 60 separate open-
ended, semi-structured interviews with local health workers, government officials and administrators, 
Ebola survivors and their families, community leaders, and national and international responders.  
The overall finding of the report is that an Ebola epidemic, along with the way the response itself is 
conducted, can have significant social, psychological, economic, and health impacts for the 
communities involved. By providing a close, qualitative reportage on perceptions of the epidemic and 
the response in Equateur Province, the report aims to render tangible the social, political and economic 
dimensions of an Ebola epidemic and to offer recommendations for the response which prepare 
communities for life ‘post-Ebola’ at each stage of an intervention.  
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to be done before, during and after an epidemic in 
order to minimize the health, social and economic impacts of the epidemic. This report, Part Two: 
Response, which provides information and recommendations on transmission, risk communication, 
contact tracing, vaccine deployment, case management, and burials. It is part of a series which 
examines each one of the temporal stages of an epidemic from the report ‘Planning for Post-Ebola’ 
(Alcayna-Stevens 2018). The other reports in the series are: Part One: Preparedness, provides 
information and recommendations on emergence, surveillance and health system capacity, vulnerable 
and marginalized populations, and the political and economic context of the 2018 Equateur outbreak; 
and Part Three: Recovery, which provides information and recommendations on the economic, health 
(including mental health), and social repercussions of the epidemic and response. An index can be 
found at the end of the report to locate cross-cutting themes covered in multiple sections. 
The report provides recommendations relevant for supervisors working on risk communication, 
coordination, surveillance and contact tracing, infection prevention and control, case management, and 
safe & dignified burials (SDBs). Recommendations are divided into those that are operational (i.e. 
immediately applicable in the event of an outbreak) and those that are orientated toward long-term 
capacity building. Key recommendations are presented at the beginning of each section and are 
brought together in the overall conclusion.  
The series proposes a Grassroots Model for Epidemic Response, based on four key principles: (1) A 
‘whole society’ approach that attends not only to those individuals directly affected by the outbreak, 
but also to their broader communities; (2) a commitment to inclusivity appreciates that ‘communities’ 
are not homogenous, and prioritizes the engagement of marginalized and vulnerable populations; (3) 
an attention to local stakes that can help responders appreciate why Ebola epidemics are understood 
through the lens of broader issues such as politics, economics and religion; and finally, (4) a 
commitment to utilizing pre-existing epidemic response capacity in order to coordinate an effective 
response and ensures that interventions build on the social and cultural resources of the communities 
they seek to support. 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA 
 
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to be done before, during and after an epidemic. Each 
of the reports in this series examines one of these temporal stages. During ‘preparedness’, the focus is 
on reducing vulnerability to disaster and strengthening capacity, surveillance and early detection. 
‘Response’ begins with a coordinated and rapid investigation, and then the implementation of 
appropriate control and case management, which is supported at each step and in every aspect by 
robust, clear and two-way communication. Finally, ‘recovery’ focuses on evaluation and accompanies 
affected communities in their lives ‘post-Ebola.’ Each stage should seek to minimise the health, social 
and economic impacts of the epidemic.  
 
  
PREPAREDNESS
RESPONSE
RECOVERY
 
GRASSROOTS MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC RESPONSE 
 
(1) A ‘WHOLE SOCIETY’ APPROACH attends not only to those individuals directly  
affected by the outbreak, but also to their broader communities.  
 
(2) A COMMITMENT TO INCLUSIVITY appreciates that ‘communities’ are not 
homogenous  
and prioritizes the engagement of marginalized and vulnerable populations. 
 
(3) ATTENDING TO LOCAL PERSPECTIVES can help responders appreciate why Ebola 
epidemics  
are understood through alternative lenses and broader issues, such as politics,  
economics and religion.  
 
(4) UTILIZING PRE-EXISTING EPIDEMIC RESPONSE CAPACITY ensures that interventions 
build on  
the social and cultural resources of the communities they seek to support.  
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: 
RESPONSE 
 
An effective epidemic response requires coordination on the part of epidemiologists, clinicians, 
logisticians and communications experts. Epidemiologists are involved in outbreak investigation, 
surveillance and contact tracing. Clinicians are involved in vaccination, case management, and in the 
management of safe and dignified burials. Communications experts are integrated into the other pillars 
and facilitate two-way communication between responders and communities. The technical teams 
must be supported by local political, administrative and public health authorities, which make decisions 
on infrastructure, regulations, vaccinations, and so on, based on advice from the coordinating team. 
The coordinating team is made up of representatives from the technical subgroups, logistics and 
administrative personnel, and headed by the representative of the Ministry of Public Health. This 
section of the report provides detail on areas of the response which could have been more coordinated 
and effective during the 2018 Equateur outbreak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESPONSE
RECOVERY
PREPAREDNESS
Operational recommendation 
Work with local artists and social scientists to develop culturally 
appropriate communications material and engage communities 
in the planning of response activities. 
Operational recommendation 
The initial epidemiological investigation should 
determine the epicenter of the epidemic, and 
treatment centers should be set up as close to that 
epicenter as possible to minimize the distance patients 
need to travel from their families for treatment. 
Furthermore, families should be kept informed and 
involved at all stages of treatment. 
 
Operational recommendation 
Vaccine information should be given to whole 
communities, so that they can understand who is 
considered at risk and thus eligible, and why the vaccine 
is recommended for certain individuals and not others. 
Operational recommendation 
Work with health officials to select community health 
workers at the outset of the epidemic, and provide them 
with the technical and logistical support that will facilitate 
their coordination and supervision duties. 
Operational recommendation 
Vaccine teams should go to the homes of 
close contacts who cannot travel to health 
centers.  
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
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2. RESPONSE 
 
2.1 RISK COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
The following section summarizes the communication and community engagement work which is the most 
important aspect of any epidemic response: without the support and participation of the community, 
responses are doomed to failure. UNICEF is committed to recruiting local mobilisers, thereby enabling the 
response to have access to local knowledge and a deep understanding of the context. Two-way 
communication is essential to the establishment of trust and to finding effective solutions. It is particularly 
important because people’s attitudes and priorities shift as a product of their relationship with the disease 
and the response itself. 2 Communication media should therefore be constantly rethought and redesigned. 
2.1.1 COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
Community engagement (CE) is the stimulation of 
community dialogue platforms (urban, rural, 
media, other) and is a process not an event.  CE 
aims to support community leaders and assure 
that decisions are made with a participatory 
approach where voices of women, youth and the 
marginalized are heard.  
The objective of community engagement 
activities is to reach as many people as possible. 
In Mbandaka, workshops were organized for 
health actors, and taxi and bicycle chauffeurs. 
These efforts are to be commended. The bicycle 
and taxi chauffeurs were able to reach a wide 
cross-section of the population. However, we 
identified three other groups which could have 
benefitted from engagement and risk education: 
religious leaders, customary leaders (see also 
2.1.4: Local leaders) and women’s associations 
(see also 1.1.3: Gender). 
Community engagement activities should be 
made as participatory as possible. This means that 
they should be presented in a language which can 
be understood be all participants, that people 
should have numerous opportunities to choose 
groups within which they feel comfortable 
participating, e.g. some activities aimed 
particularly at ethnic minorities or women. 
When people feel that they lack information 
and decision-making power frustrations can 
quickly develop. Communities should be engaged 
in the planning of response activities and 
consulted as these activities develop and change. 
As well as fostering active participation, this 
                                                          
2 Ripoll et al (2018). 
3 Abramowitz et al (2017). 
4 Bedford (2018a). 
practice can provide the response with 
operationally useful information. 
Different modes of community engagement 
that tap into a variety of local platforms should be 
employed strategically and should be evaluated 
so that limited resources can be channeled to 
have the greatest impact, while targeting a range 
of different groups: e.g. health workers, women’s 
associations, taxi and bicycle drivers, customs 
agents, religious leaders, customary leaders, etc.  
2.1.2 COMMUNICATING RISK 
Risk communication refers to the exchange of life-
saving information during times of threat and 
danger. When confronted with accelerating 
community deaths, people are more likely to 
incorporate health information, provided they 
acquire it through local networks.3 UNICEF 
therefore trains community health workers and 
local leaders in risk communication. 
Action-based workshops that use ‘edutainment’ 
methods and role-play have been reported to be 
well received with attendees displaying a higher-
level of sustained engagement.4 Rather than 
simply repeating basic messages and offering 
instructions, explanations must be offered about 
the rationale behind the behaviors (e.g. hand-
washing, SDB) being proposed. 
It is important to be aware that people will often 
expect compensation for the time they take to 
attend activities and workshops, in the form of 
food on the day, and money ‘for transport’. 
During the outbreak, tensions erupted when it 
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was discovered that the response was paying the 
owners of taxi motorcycles and not the taximen 
themselves for their risk communication 
activities.5 Participants of community 
engagement activities and those undertaking 
RCCE should be fairly paid or compensated – 
research should be conducted to make sure that 
it is those conducting the work, and not 
mediators who are paid for this activity. 
Meaningful community dialogue which 
facilitates the two-way exchange of information 
should be encouraged. Different modes of 
community engagement that tap into a variety of 
local platforms should be employed strategically 
and should be evaluated so that limited resources 
can be channeled to have the greatest impact, 
while targeting a range of different groups: e.g. 
health workers, women’s associations, taxi and 
bicycle drivers, customs agents, religious leaders, 
customary leaders, etc. 
                                                          
5 More detail on the risk communication activities of taxi 
motorcycles can be found in Kemba (2018). 
Operational recommendation 
›› Communication teams should inform different 
populations about all aspects of the response, so 
that certain elements (e.g. SDBs, vaccination, 
ETCs) don’t remain mysterious to the broader 
community.  
2.1.3 COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKERS 
As respected members of the community, 
community health workers (RECO) were 
invaluable in RCCE activities. Given their 
experience, they were able to begin activities 
right away, doing from ‘door to door’ and 
promoting open discussions and providing 
community feedback for response teams. RECO 
activities were coordinated through the 
community outreach units (CAC). 
However, they often lacked the equipment and 
support (e.g. bicycles or motorbikes, fuel, torches, 
LOCAL CAPACITY 
Ministry of Public Health (MPH) - Develops health policies and standards and coordinates technical and 
financial partners, such as donors and NGOs at the national level. 
National Institute of Biomedical Research (Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale or INRB) – Established in 
1984, it provides laboratories for experts working on haemorrhagic fevers (Marburg and Ebola) and other 
tropical diseases. 
Provincial health division (DPS) – Collects, analyzes, and interprets health data from the health zones. It 
transmits information to administrative provincial authorities as well as the MPH. 
Health area development committee (CODESA) – Includes members from important social groups, local 
networks and opinion leaders, and social service partners, and works at the level of the health area, each of 
which contains approximately one health center. The CODESA participates in health activity planning, 
management, and monitoring; conducts community mobilization; receives reports from the CAC; and meets 
monthly with health center staff to analyze results and resolve issues. 
Community health workers (relais communautaire or RECO) - RECOs are volunteers who have promoted and 
provided health interventions in communities for many years. RECOs are volunteers who deliver a minimum 
package of activities related to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH), including 
integrated community case management for malaria, diarrhea, and respiratory diseases; nutrition; WASH; 
HIV and AIDS; and disease prevention. RECOs conduct home visits, household mapping, referrals, monitoring, 
and community-based surveillance. They have three-year renewable contracts with local authorities but can 
be replaced before the end of the contract if the community is unsatisfied with their performance.  
Community outreach units (Cellule d’Animation Communautaire or CAC) - Led by an elected local leader (the 
community animator, or ‘AC’), they comprise influential elected individuals from that locality, including RECO. 
The CAC meets monthly and reports to the CODESA. It coordinates village development activities; promotes 
healthy behaviors; coordinates RECO activities, including delivery of the minimum health package; supports 
distribution of health products; conducts community mapping and monitoring; and manages community care 
sites. 
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watches, phone credit) necessary to undertake 
their work. Several met with resistance early in 
the epidemic and would have appreciated official 
uniforms which they could have used to 
legitimate the messages they were giving people. 
The RECO who participated in this research 
emphasized the quality of the WHO/UNICEF 
training they received through Oxfam, IFRC and 
CARITAS. However, representatives of CAC and 
community health committees (CODESA) felt that 
WHO workshops would have been more effective 
and wide-reaching if they had been conducted in 
collaboration with the CAC and CODESA, as 
UNICEF training workshops were.  
Many RECO who participated in the research 
were frustrated at the discrepancies in pay – and 
late payments – between different organizations 
(i.e. UNICEF and WHO). Many RECO argued that 
just because they are normally volunteers, does 
not mean they should be paid so little ($2 per day 
for some) to do work which they found dangerous 
and stigmatizing. They were particularly 
frustrated by this when word circulated that 
certain international responders were receiving a 
per diem of $300 per day, while working in air-
conditioned rooms in the coordination offices.  
Operational recommendations 
›› Provide RECO with logistical support (e.g. 
bicycles, phone credit, watches, torches). 
›› Make sure that RECO are being paid fairly, 
consistently and on-time.  Psycho-social experts 
should be assigned to support RECO who may be 
stigmatized or encounter resistance. 
2.1.4 LOCAL LEADERS 
The engagement of trusted local authorities and 
community leaders is essential in order to stem 
misinformation and fear, to encourage people to 
report symptoms, to help minimize social 
stigmatization, and to facilitate exchange 
between the response and communities. 
However, in rural Congolese communities, there 
is rarely one community leader, and a range of 
leaders should be targeted. 
The first of these are customary leaders – village 
chiefs or ‘groupement’ chiefs and village elders. 
Customary leaders, elders and traditional healers 
                                                          
6 Gillespie, Obregon et al. (2016). 
have many traditional ways of stimulating 
community support or adherence.  
The second are religious leaders. They are 
trusted members of the community who people 
turn to in ties of sickness and distress, and their 
word carries weight. They also have the attention 
of large numbers of the population at least once 
a week, and sometimes every morning or 
evening. As one pastor explained: 
Most rural Congolese are Christian (even as they 
simultaneously hold non-Christian beliefs). 
However, there are a wide variety of churches. 
During the epidemic, the Catholic Church was 
very active in RCCE and suspended sacraments.  
The Protestant Church (federated under the 
Eglise de Christ du Congo) also participated in 
RCCE and attempted to support affected 
protestant communities. However, they often 
lacked the support of CARITAS, a formal structure 
of the Catholic Church providing logistics, 
healthcare and sustainable development, and a 
local partner of UNICEF. We were told by two 
Protestant pastors that CARITAS supports 
Catholic churches and health clinics more than 
Protestant ones, even with epidemic funds. It is 
essential that CARITAS distribute resources 
supplied by partners like UNICEF fairly, regardless 
of religious denomination. 
The response was not successful in engaging the 
majority of Pentecostal churches, some of which 
were actively opposed to the response’s Ebola 
narrative and RCCE efforts. Response teams 
should try to engage the leaders of Pentecostal 
churches into the response by reaching out to 
them directly and through adherents who are 
themselves heath actors. 
It is important to remain aware that recruitment 
of traditional leaders runs the risk of ignoring the 
needs and voices of marginalized populations.6 
See also: 1.1.2 Ethnic minorities; 1.1.3 Gender.  
Trusted community leaders do not always 
coincide with self-appointed leaders, and social 
scientists should attempt to identify important 
“If the message has not been 
relayed by a religious leader, then 
you might as well say the message 
has not been received” 
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local leaders through discussions with the 
community, while attempting also to look for 
power struggles or conflicts.  
Operational recommendation 
›› Pastors should be trained in risk communication 
and encouraged to cascade information to their 
congregations. As should church-based 
community mobilizers. Religious leaders would 
also benefit from psycho-social training and could 
be encouraged to organize support groups in 
which people could voice their anxieties about the 
epidemic and the response. 
2.1.5 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
At the onset of the epidemic, there were many 
alternative explanations for the escalating 
community deaths. Many of these centered on 
accusations of witchcraft connected to land 
disputes, to punishment by ancestors or angered 
traditional healers, or to jealousy or revenge.7 
The reason that these stories continued to 
persist throughout the epidemic, and continue to 
do so even now, when most people believe that 
the deaths were connected to the Ebola virus, is 
that even when it is accepted that an individual 
has a biomedical disease (e.g. tuberculosis), 
family members will still search for the reason 
why that individual became sick with that disease.  
Other stories also abound concerning, not the 
origins of the outbreak, but the reason for which 
it continued to spread to other villages. Some 
people believed that foreign and national 
response teams had used the spate of community 
deaths to come and infect people with Ebola to 
make money during the response and through 
the deployment of the vaccine. This is connected 
to a fear and suspicion held by many people that 
biomedical and traditional healers have the 
power to kill as well as the power to cure.  
Communication teams must make it their 
priority to tackle misinformation at every level of 
community engagement, by providing clear, 
consistent information and listening to concerns. 
In official terminology in the North Kivu outbreak, 
the terms ‘alternative explanations’ and 
‘circulating stories’ are already being 
preferentially deployed over ‘rumor tracking’, 
which suggests negative and false information. 
It is important to understand the factors which 
lead to alternative explanations – they are not 
simply the product of ‘ignorance,’ but are often 
based on past experience, on particular local 
histories and politics and on very real fears. 
Communication teams should understand the 
underlying basis and stakes of alternative 
explanations in order to integrate counter-
arguments into their messaging and community 
engagement activities. 
2.1.6 USING MEDIA 
Language and literacy are important factors when 
considering the use of media in RCCE. Several 
local community animators told us that people in 
the villages of Bikoro and Iboko health zones 
could not understand the health education 
posters and flyers due to high levels of illiteracy.  
Furthermore, one Mbandaka-based sociologist 
informed us that people found the imaging 
confusing – e.g. the man wrapped in a blanket did 
not make them think of fever, but rather that a 
cure for Ebola was to wrap up in warm clothes.  
The sociologist emphasized that oral 
communication is much more effective in rural 
Congolese villages than visual communication. 
This was echoed by community members who 
emphasized the importance of radio and the use 
of megaphones. Better than megaphones, 
according to RECO, however, was the ‘door to 
door’ (porte a porte) method, in which they 
visited each family in order to spend time 
explaining the RCCE messages to them in person. 
Communications teams should prioritize oral 
communication in the form of announcements, 
information sessions, radio programs and ‘door 
by door’ communication in order to meet the 
delivery needs of rural populations. In North Kivu, 
advances are also being made with music, social 
media platforms and mobile phone messaging. 8 
Operational recommendation 
›› Communications teams should work with local 
artists and social scientists to create risk 
communication media, rather than bringing pre-
made posters and flyers. 
                                                          
7 More detail is provided in Duda (2018). 8 Bedford (2018b). 
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2.2 CONTACT TRACING & VACCINATION  
This section outlines how response teams successfully ‘broke the transmission chain’ through surveillance, 
contact tracing and the first vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV) deployment during an active Ebola epidemic. During 
interviews, several local doctors suggested that the epidemic would have been ‘a catastrophe’ without the 
vaccine. However, the section also examines the short-comings of the vaccine deployment in Equateur, and 
the ways in which future campaigns could be improved. 
2.2.1 CONTACT TRACING 
Contact tracing relies on identifying those who 
have had close contact with an infected person, 
as well as contacts of those contacts, so that they 
can be monitored for symptoms of the disease. 
Some of these people may be incubating the 
disease, and the purpose of contact tracing is to 
locate them to that they can be vaccinated and 
monitored.  
RECO were as invaluable in tracing contacts and 
monitoring contacts as they were in risk 
communication activities. Understanding local 
family structures and how this translates into 
responsibilities for care and burial is crucial to 
understanding mobility and being able to locate 
contacts. This is where RECO’s experience and 
embeddedness within communities becomes 
indispensable.  
These RECO often lacked the equipment and 
support necessary to undertake and coordinate 
their work – especially when contacts were 
hidden in difficult-to-access forest or river camps 
necessitating ‘expeditionary surveillance.’ They 
were also frustrated at the discrepancies in pay – 
and late payments – and in organization between 
different organizations (i.e. UNICEF and WHO).  
Given their daily interactions with contacts, they 
lamented that they were not offered full personal 
protective equipment (PPE). This equipment was 
determined by epidemiologists to be unnecessary 
for RECO, if this is the case then they require 
further training in order to be reassured of this. 
Several presidents of the local health 
committees (CODESA), themselves RECO, argued 
that many RECO were frustrated in their efforts to 
complete their tasks because they could not read 
the forms they were asked to fill out. They 
suggested that in future epidemics, organizations 
coordinate their efforts and ask CODESA 
presidents to suggest suitable (literate and 
reliable) RECO.  
Some community animators (AC) pointed to the 
ways they coordinate other epidemic (e.g. 
cholera) surveillance, with weekly schedules, so 
that they can easily localize RECO. They noted 
that the Ebola epidemic was more pressurized 
and chaotic but suggested that being more 
involved in the initial selection and coordination 
of RECO would have made surveillance run more 
smoothly and effectively. 
Several of the AC we interviewed who had 
supervised RECO, lamented the different forms 
used by UNICEF and WHO, which made it more 
complicated for them to synthesize data and 
transmit it in their own reports. In order to 
complete this painstaking work each day, they 
would have appreciated access to a computer and 
printer. They would also have appreciated 
compilation forms, where they could rapidly 
synthesize the data provided by RECO. They also 
noted that sometimes they were not provided 
with enough forms and could have benefitted 
from access to a photocopier in order to provide 
for all the RECO under their supervision. 
Some RECO suggested that they had not been 
taught how to fill out the forms correctly, and that 
in some cases they were not paid when forms had 
mistakes, despite the fact that they had worked 
that day. Once again, this may have been avoided 
if AC and presidents of CODESA had coordinated 
the deployment of RECO from the start.  
Operational recommendations 
›› Provide RECO with logistical support (e.g. 
bicycles, phone credit, watches, torches). 
›› Involve AC and CODESA in the selection and 
coordination of RECO right from the start – work 
with them in order to homogenize forms, create 
synthesis forms and schedule RECO activities. 
Make efforts to give RECO supervisors access to 
computers and photocopiers. 
2.2.2 MONITORING 
Once contacts have been established and located, 
they are interviewed and checked for symptoms 
(particularly temperature). If the contact is found 
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to be symptomatic, they should be transported to 
an Ebola treatment center and tested there. 
Testing the patient while they are still in the 
community is to be avoided, as it delays moving 
them to a safer location.  
All close contacts were monitored for 21 days 
following their last known exposure to a case. 
They were monitored on a daily basis and their 
temperature taken.  
Contacts were also encouraged not to leave 
their houses (and thus limited in their economic 
activities). Provision of food was the primary 
concern for people when committing to isolation, 
and they were therefore given supplementary 
food (rice, beans, oil) by UNICEF and WFP.  
RECO worked in close collaboration with the 
psycho-social experts, who sought to reduce 
stigmatization of those affected (including the 
families of contacts) by counselling those affected 
and educating and reassuring families and 
neighbors. Many families cited this distribution as 
one of the factors which made them collaborate 
with the response. 
2.2.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE VACCINE 
Frontline health workers were vaccinated, 
followed by a ‘ring vaccination’ method which 
targeted contacts of patients and contacts of 
contacts. Communication around the vaccine is 
crucial as negative community perceptions and 
understandings of why some people are 
vaccinated and others not augments social risks 
associated with distrust, suspicion and 
stigmatization.  
Despite concerns that communities may be 
resistant to it, however, the ring vaccination 
campaign was largely successful.  
Nonetheless, there were, and continue to be, 
certain negative perceptions surrounding it. 
Some of these include rumors that Ebola was re-
introduced to the DRC to enable the experimental 
rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine to be trialed. Other fears 
were that the vaccine would kill or sterilize those 
who received it, or that it would give them Ebola. 
This fear was especially prevalent among PA 
communities, and was best countered by RECO 
and APS who were themselves PA. See also 1.1.2: 
Ethnic minorities.  
                                                          
9 Anoko & Falero (2018). 
There was some concern about ‘resistance’ to 
the vaccine among Twa communities.9 Adherents 
of certain evangelical and revivalist movements 
also appear to have been opposed.  
While overall people were satisfied with the 
follow-up exams and treatment they received for 
side-effects, the initial fear, and a lingering 
concern, are very real. Several of the people who 
participated in the research continued to 
experience pain in their arms at the site of the 
injection several months later. In one village, 
several people reported feeling nauseous in the 
first 2-3 days, and then feeling incredibly hungry 
– a hunger which was still with them to this day. 
Further research must be conducted to 
determine the long-term physical effects of the 
vaccine, as well as the ways in which is comes to 
symbolize larger grievances with the response. 
We also came across several villages where 
people did not feel that they had given their 
informed consent prior to the vaccination. There 
appear to have been discrepancies in the 
deployment of the vaccine, with some people 
having read and signed consent forms before 
their inoculation, and others being presented 
with the forms only after they had been 
inoculated. People also lamented the fact that 
consent forms were written in French, even 
though many people either do not speak the 
language or cannot read. This was a source of 
particular concern for those who said that they 
had not even realized that the vaccine was 
experimental until after it had been administered.  
Several of the people who participated in the 
research felt that they had been used as test 
subjects for pharmaceutical companies which 
would now make billions of dollars selling the 
vaccines:  
Education campaigns need to be sensitive to fears 
which are not purely about ignorance, but about 
a real affective and visceral feeling of fear – 
communities cannot simply be given information, 
they must be given reassurance and allowed to 
voice their fears and concerns in order to 
progressively develop communications around 
“They will sell that vaccine for 
billions. It was tested on us, but we 
will not benefit.” 
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the vaccine, including in the months following 
vaccination. See also: 3.1.5 Embezzlement & 
unfulfilled promises. 
Even if they are not contacts, it may be 
beneficial to publicly vaccinate influential 
community leaders and administrators who 
volunteer for the vaccine in order to reassure the 
broader community. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Rumors about the vaccine can be combatted 
most effectively if education, information and 
reassurance is given to whole communities, and 
not simply to those within the ring, so they can 
understand why the vaccine is recommended for 
certain community members and not others.  
2.2.4 SIDE EFFECTS OF THE VACCINE 
There were also issues around the 
communication of risk to pregnant women. Until 
the ethics committee came to its decision on the 
protocol for pregnant and breastfeeding women 
(i.e. during the first few days of the campaign), 
these women were vaccinated – apparently 
without any supplemental information on 
potential health risks. People who participated in 
the research described one woman who had a 
miscarriage afterwards, and one woman who had 
a still birth. We also heard reports of other 
women who experienced bleeding after the 
vaccine. These women blame the vaccine and 
demand ‘justice’ and compensation for their loss.  
Protocols for obtaining consent should always 
be followed, and information given in a language 
and format which patients can easily understand. 
Any populations at higher risk (e.g. pregnant 
women) should have this clearly explained to 
them at some length before receiving the vaccine. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Aftercare should be provided to women who lost 
a child after being vaccinated.  
2.2.5 VACCINE: BARRIERS TO ACCESS 
The vaccine was so popular that many of the 
people who participated in the research said that 
after an initial fear and resistance, they had 
sought out the vaccine only to be denied. In most 
cases, this was because they were outside the 
ring. However, many people had understood that 
the vaccine had simply ‘run out.’ This 
misunderstanding suggests that more could be 
done to inform broader communities about the 
role of the vaccine campaign. 
In one village, we were told that once contacts 
and health actors had been vaccinated, the 
vaccine was opened up to village leaders (such as 
religious leaders and elders). We could not verify 
this information, but if it is true, then it may have 
contributed to understandings that the vaccines 
simply ‘ran out.’ 
More worryingly, however, we also found 
several cases of close contacts who had not been 
vaccinated despite the fact that they would have 
liked to be. Some were elderly or sick people who 
had not been able to make the journey from their 
village or homestead to the health center where 
the vaccines were being administered. Others 
were widows who, despite being in direct contact 
with deceased husbands, were in a period of 
mourning and seclusion which did not permit 
them to leave their homes to travel to the health 
centers. Other contacts said that they had simply 
not been informed about the vaccine campaign. 
Health actors with whom we spoke compared 
the vaccine campaign unfavorably with their own 
routine vaccine campaigns, in which they go from 
door to door to make sure that all children are 
vaccinated. They argued that restricting the 
vaccine teams exclusively to health centers (some 
up to 10km from contacts’ homes) limited the 
number of people eligible for the vaccine who 
could actually attend the vaccination. Health 
actors also pointed to the fact that some people 
were temporarily absent in hunting, fishing or 
gathering camps deep in the forest, and that the 
campaign should have passed through again one 
or two weeks later in order to reach those people 
who had returned from the forest. 
Vaccination protocol should consider the 
benefits of vaccinating community health 
workers, hygienists and burial teams. If this is 
determined to be unnecessary, then these people 
should have the reasons for this decision clearly 
explained to them. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Vaccine teams should consider visiting villages 
twice to reach people who were temporarily 
absent, and actively going to the homes of people 
who cannot travel to health centers but are 
nonetheless close contacts.  
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2.3 TREATMENT OF THE SICK AND DECEASED 
This section outlines the significant improvements which response teams have made in caring for the sick 
and the deceased since the first Ebola epidemic in 1976. Even during the West Africa crisis, 2-4 years ago, 
ETCs were often thought of as ‘death camps’ – by the end of the Ebola epidemic in Equateur, however, they 
were being referred to as ‘paradise-like.’ Nonetheless, improvements can still be made in several aspects of 
care, especially through community participation in safe and dignified burials. 
2.3.1 TAKING BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES 
One of the strongest cases of resistance 
encountered by response teams was against the 
taking of biological samples from suspected cases 
(sick patients or the deceased). 
There are two primary reasons for this 
resistance: (1) people fear that in taking samples, 
response teams may give them Ebola or in some 
other way harm them; (2) early in the epidemic, 
being diagnosed with Ebola, or having a deceased 
family member diagnosed with Ebola post-
mortem, was a source of shame and stigma.  
It is from the practice of taking blood samples 
that response teams acquire the name of 
‘vampires’ or ‘blood-suckers’ (suceurs de sang in 
French). It is often rumored that they take such 
samples in order to bewitch a patient or else sell 
his or her blood or body parts. It is particularly 
difficult to convince family members to allow 
samples to be taken from a deceased relative, as 
by that point, nothing more can be done to treat 
or save them. 
To get around this early resistance, several 
health actors admitted to telling patients that 
they would have a routine exam of blood, urine 
and stool samples for another disease, and then 
secretly testing their sample for Ebola. This clearly 
raises ethical concerns around consent, but it was 
framed by health actors as the best way to 
minimize the stigma and fear associated with 
being tested for Ebola. 
One of the most impactful issues, in the long 
term, concerns the fact that patients are seldom 
informed about a negative result. This leaves 
many people wondering whether they or their 
family members had EVD. Given the significant 
food and monetary assistance Ebola survivors 
have received, this has led some people, 
particularly in the village of Boyeka (which some 
believe may have been the source of the Ebola 
outbreak as far back as January 2018), to make 
claims on the government and response, 
demanding that they receive the same level of 
support and compensation for their losses. The 
authorities, however, refuse to do so, saying that 
an epidemiological team tested certain cases in 
Boyeka and found no evidence of Ebola. However, 
the affected community has never officially been 
informed. 
Response teams must work closely with 
community health workers in order to provide 
families with accurate information and allay their 
fears. The first people to speak with affected 
families should be communications and psycho-
social experts, in order to minimize the attention 
and shame which can accompany the appearance 
of a biomedical team.  
Furthermore, it is imperative that individuals, 
families and communities tested for Ebola are 
informed, in a timely manner, if their results are 
negative.  
2.3.2 PERCEPTIONS OF ETCS 
Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs) are often 
established alongside functioning health facilities. 
MSF set up their initial ETC close to Bikoro general 
hospital. However, given that people had 
travelled from villages in that health zone to a 
closer hospital in Itipo village, many cases were 
being diagnosed more than 40km from the MSF 
ETC, requiring patients to travel (or be 
transported) far from their families for treatment. 
This greatly exacerbated resistance at the start of 
the epidemic. 
People often find Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) frightening, saying that doctors 
look like ‘monsters’ or ‘aliens.’ This can be 
minimized if suits are taken on and off in public, 
and by making sure that doctors never arrive in a 
village already wearing them. 
As the epidemic progressed, people became 
less afraid of ETC. This was due to two primary 
factors: (1) the opening of an ALIMA ETC in Itipo 
which meant that patients did not have to travel 
far from home; (2) the reintegration of Ebola 
survivors who had been successfully treated in 
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ETCs. Survivors and their testimonies can 
demystify ETCs, and they often play an important 
role in bringing trust and hope to communities 
about patient care in the ETCs, and proving, 
through their own experience, that with 
treatment and care, people can survive.  
In the West Africa outbreak, community 
members and leaders were given tours of ETC 
‘green zones’. This was not the case in Equateur, 
but several people who participated in the 
research had heard positive stories about ETCs 
both from survivors and from community 
members working as hygienists, nurses or on 
construction work around the ETCs. 
The importance of family care and of not being 
isolated should not be underestimated. Typically, 
when rural people spend time in hospital, they 
are accompanied by their family, who become 
their ‘guardians’ (garde malade in French). The 
role of such guardians is not simply to provide 
solidarity and companionship through the 
biomedical process, but also to provide meals for 
the patient (food is not provided at hospital), 
giving additional personal care, negotiating their 
treatment (including payment) and advocating 
with health workers on their behalf. 
Some of the people who spoke about early 
experience with ETC, told of frightening and 
confusing encounters in which they were not kept 
informed about the status of their family member 
and about the kind of treatment they were 
receiving.  
The response must negotiate a delicate balance 
between encouraging patients to seek treatment 
at an ETC, where they can be monitored and 
isolated, and recognizing that patients are there 
voluntarily. This is especially complex when 
patients are too weak to express their wishes and 
when families must make decisions on their 
behalf. The two patients who were taken from the 
ETC in Mbandaka on 22 May, sought alternative 
treatment at church prayer groups. The family 
told us that they were then taken back to the ETC 
by police and soldiers by force.  
However, towards the end of the outbreak, 
patients were actively seeking out treatment at 
the ALIMA ETC in Itipo. While no confirmed Ebola 
cases were treated at this ETC, several health 
workers and other community members 
described it as ‘like paradise,’ with good food, 
                                                          
10 Richards et al (2015). 
clean sheets, air conditioning, music playing, toys 
for children to play with. They also appreciated 
the ALIMA Biosecure Emergency Care Units 
(CUBE) because they were able to see family 
members throughout their treatment and wave 
to them from a distance.  
In order to demystify ETCs, response teams 
should introduce people to hazmat suits and body 
bags during risk communication activities and 
survivors (including the national survivors’ 
association, ANVE) should be employed in RCCE 
activities and on radio programs. Some survivors 
can also provide help within ETCs themselves, 
given that they are no longer at risk of Ebola 
contamination. 
Engaging religious leaders to hold prayer 
sessions in proximity to the sick (but behind 
protective barriers) in ETCs, may also provide 
psychosocial support and discourage patients 
from absconding to seek alternative treatment. 
Operational recommendations 
›› The initial epidemiological investigation should 
determine the epicenter of the epidemic, and the 
ETC should be set up as close to that epicenter as 
possible to minimize the distance patients need to 
travel from their families for treatment.  
›› Patients cannot be treated as atomized 
individuals. Their families must be kept informed 
and involved at all stages of treatment.  
2.3.3 SAFE AND DIGNIFIED BURIALS 
Ebola has been called a ‘disease of social intimacy’ 
because it disproportionately affects those 
meeting their social responsibilities to care for 
their loved ones, including healers and doctors, 
who are highly respected people in their 
communities.10 
While much is often made of the role of health 
actors as agents in ‘super-spreading events’, the 
Itipo nurse who contaminated several other 
people, did so not through medical practice, but 
because he was a respected and beloved member 
of the community, whose body was carried by 
many and whose funeral was attended by several 
hundred people. This example serves to illustrate 
that safe burials are one of the most important 
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elements in breaking the transmission chain of 
EVD.  
Safe, securitized burials are also an important 
site of resistance. This has been reported in 
previous outbreaks and centers on the fact that 
deceased Ebola patients have often been buried 
by response teams without a funeral or coffin and 
without the presence of family members. It is well 
documented that having no proof of death and 
not being able to bury a relative in an acceptable 
manner, compounds the distress experienced by 
communities and fuels suspicions that people are 
being murdered and their organs and body parts 
sold by response teams. This can have a 
continuing and devastating impact on the 
everyday life and long-term mental health of 
affected communities.  
It is for this reason that protocol now specifies 
use of the term ‘safe and dignified burial.’ 
Dignified means that burials should be 
appropriate for the cultural context and take 
account of the individual preferences of families 
on the timing and location of the burial, and on 
important ritual and aesthetic elements, 
including a coffin, prayers and the possibility for 
mourners to see the deceased’s face. Viewing the 
body and face of the deceased is often of crucial 
importance, both as a way for family and friends 
to pay their respects to the deceased, and to 
provide visual confirmation of death and of an 
unmutilated corpse. 
Response teams face numerous logistical 
challenges, particularly in the case of ‘community 
deaths.’ People told us that they waited hours or 
days for the Croix Rouge burial team to arrive, and 
ended up burying relatives themselves and 
without protection. We also heard stories from 
the early stages of the epidemic where people 
heard of a relative’s death through unofficial 
channels before being informed by a health 
official. The timely announcement of death and 
undertaking of an SDB should be priorities for 
response teams. 
The critical importance of involving 
communities in the adjustment of SDB protocols 
to ensure they are locally appropriate and 
acceptable, keeping family members well 
informed and facilitating their engagement with 
SDB practices, and providing sustained 
psychosocial support, cannot be over-
emphasized. 
SDB should be a priority right from the start of 
the response and people should not be left 
waiting for a burial team for long when there is a 
community death – RECO can be used to monitor 
the sick and to inform teams when a death 
appears imminent. 
Efforts need to be made in risk communication 
and with psycho-social experts to inform 
communities about the importance of SDB and to 
gather feedback on appropriate SDB for the 
cultural context. Focus groups can help response 
teams prepare appropriate materials and 
resources, but SDB should always be conducted 
according to guidance from the bereaved family 
itself.   
It is important that families give prior consent 
for an SDB and that they are not coerced by 
military, police or health authorities. Efforts 
should be made to assure that SDB teams always 
include one psycho-social expert. The response 
may also consider including religious or 
customary leaders, who would benefit from the 
training and information and could help to put 
bereaved families at ease. 
Operational recommendation 
›› SDB teams should provide coffins and a small 
contribution for the funerary rituals of Ebola 
victims and cloth to line the coffin.  
2.3.4 FREE HEALTH CARE 
Free health care during and after the epidemic 
has helped to strengthen and rebuild people’s 
trust in health structures and practitioners and 
has led to early reporting and presentation of 
signs and symptoms, thus facilitating surveillance 
efforts. It is one of the most widely praised public 
health strategies of the intervention. 
However, it is not without its challenges. At first, 
people were very suspicious, and some people 
avoided the health centers, fearing that free 
medications were people used to give people 
Ebola. These fears had been reduced by RCCE and 
when people treated did not catch EVD. However, 
people also found the infrared thermometers 
frightening, because they resemble guns and do 
not need to touch a person in order to read their 
temperature, but do so, as if ‘by witchcraft’ 
(kindoki in Lingala). 
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More importantly, however, free health care 
has put the whole rural health system under 
strain. This is not simply because they are 
understaffed and experiencing high demand – 
hundreds of patients per day according to one of 
the nurses who participated in the research. It is 
also because many rural nurses do not receive a 
regular state salary, or any salary at all (many lack 
a social security number and there are numerous 
obstacles to transferring money to rural areas 
with no banks for hundreds of miles). These 
nurses make a living by charging for consultations, 
or by making a small profit on the sale of 
medicines. Nurses (who often work in villages 
which are not their own, and therefore cannot 
rely on family support networks) use the money 
they earn through consultations to buy 
agricultural produce.  As one nurse explained: 
While rural health actors are supposed to receive 
support and compensation for this lost income, in 
practice, many of those who participated in the 
research said that they had received nothing. 
While some were receiving gifts from the people 
they were treating, many of the nurses we spoke 
with were struggling to support themselves, let 
alone afford their children’s school fees. Some 
said that this was leading certain members of the 
community to mock and stigmatize them, while 
their own family members continued to ostracize 
them for fear of catching EVD. 
Some doctors in Mbandaka accused rural 
nurses of continuing to charge people for health 
services. We were unable to verify these claims. 
However, some of the nurses who participated in 
the research said that they were charging people 
for medicines which had run out and were now 
only available in the nurses’ own pre-Ebola 
stockpiles (which they had bought with their own 
money).  
The depletion of medications was the only 
universal criticism which we heard about free 
health care. Nurses told us that many of the most 
commonly used medications had run out and 
were not being restocked, while other, less useful 
medications were being replenished but left 
unused. Nurses would have preferred to order in 
those medications they needed most and should 
be given the possibility to offer feedback on the 
medications and supplied they require and to 
place orders.  
Psycho-social experts should be assigned to 
support health actors who may be stigmatized in 
their own families and within the communities 
they treat. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Free health care must imperatively be 
accompanied by the full and timely payment of 
rural health actors and structures put in place to 
check and monitor this payment. 
 
  
“The health centre is my field; if I 
cannot harvest from it, I will 
starve.” 
 PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: RESPONSE | 19  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abramowitz, S., McKune, M., Fallah, J., Monger, K., Tehoungue and P. A. Omidian (2017). 'The Opposite of 
Denial: Social Learning at the Onset of the Ebola Emergency in Liberia.' Journal of Health Communication 
22(sup1): 59-65. 
Abramowitz, S. A., K. E., McLean, S., L. McKune., Bardosh, K. L., M. Fallah, J., Monger, Tehoungue, K. and P. A. 
Omidian (2015). 'Community-Centered Responses to Ebola in Urban Liberia: The View from Below.' Plos 
Neglected Tropical Diseases, 9(4): e0003706. 
Alcayna-Stevens, L.  (forthcoming) ‘Epidemic economies’ 
Alcayna-Stevens, L. & Giles-Vernick, T. (forthcoming) ‘African epidemics and ecologies of blame’  
Alcayna-Stevens, L. & Bedford, J. (2018) ‘Key Considerations: Burial, Funeral and Mourning Practices in Équateur 
Province, DRC’ June 2018. Brighton and Oxford: Social Science for Humanitarian Action Platform. 
Anoko, J & Falero, F. (2018). Anthropologie de l’intervention : défis d’une riposte équitable pendant l’Epidémie 
de la MVE en RDC. Brief note for EVD Response in Mbandaka-Bikoro. 
Arwady, M. A., E. L., Garcia, B., Wollor, L. G., Mabande, E. J., Reaves, J. M., Montgomery, C. (2014). 
Reintegration of Ebola Survivors into their Communities – Firestone District, Liberia, 2014. Centers for Disease 
and Prevention MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report 63(50): 1207-1209. 
Bebell, L.M., Oduyebo, T. and Riley, L.E., (2017). Ebola virus disease and pregnancy: A review of the current 
knowledge of Ebola virus pathogenesis, maternal, and neonatal outcomes. Birth defects research, 109(5), 
pp.353-362. 
Bedford, J. (2018a). Key Considerations: The Context of North Kivu Province, DRC. Brighton and Oxford: Social 
Science for Humanitarian Action Platform. 
Bedford, J. (2018b). WhatsApp and Local Media (Grand Nord) – 9-18 September 2018. Brighton and Oxford: 
Social Science for Humanitarian Action Platform. 
Bedford, J. (2018c). Key Considerations: Health-Seeking Behaviours in Équateur Province, DRC. Brighton and 
Oxford: Social Science for Humanitarian Action Platform. 
Bedford, J. (2018d). Key Considerations: Burial, Funeral and Mourning Practices in Équateur Province, DRC June 
2018. Brighton and Oxford: Social Science for Humanitarian Action Platform. 
Bonwitt, J. M., Dawson, M., Kandeh, R., Ansumana, F., Sahr, H., Brown and Kelly, A. H. (2018). 'Unintended 
Consequences of the "bushmeat ban" in West Africa during the 2013–2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic.' 
Social Science & Medicine 200: 166-173. 
Duda, R. (2018) ‘Approche anthropologique de l’épidémie d’Ebola à Itipo, Province de l’Equateur, RDC : Rapport 
de mission.’ Paris : ALIMA. 
Duda, R., L. Alcayna-Stevens and Bedford, J. (2018). Key Considerations: Engaging Twa Communities in Équateur 
Province. Brighton and Oxford: Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform. 
Epelboin, A. and Formenty, P. (2011). Anthropologie sociale et culturelle et lutte contre les épidémies de fièvre 
Ebola et Marburg. Les maladies infectieuses émergentes: état de la situation et perspectives. Haut Conseil de 
la santé publique. Paris, LaDocumentation française. 
Epelboin A, Formenty P, Anoko J & Allarangar Y. 2008. Humanisations et consentements éclairés des personnes 
et des populations lors des réponses aux épidémies de FHV en Afrique centrale (2003-2008). In Mesures de 
contrôle des infections et droits individuels : un dilemme éthique pour le personnel médical. In Humanitarian 
Stakes N°1. September 2008. pp 25-37 [28-40] 
Epelboin, A., A. Odugleh-Kolev and Formenty, P. (2014). 'Contribution de l’anthropologie médicale à la lutte 
contre les épidémies de fièvres hémorragiques à virus Ebola et Marburg.' Flambées épidémiques de maladie à 
virus Ebola et Marburg: préparation, alerte, lutte et évaluation. OMS octobre. 
ERAP (2014). Stigma And Ebola: An Anthropological Approach to Understanding and Addressing Stigma 
Operationally in the Ebola Response. ERAP Policy briefing note 11/12/2014. Brighton: Ebola Response 
Anthropology Platform. 
 PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: RESPONSE | 20  
 
Gillespie, A. M., Obregon, R., El Asawi, R., Richey, C., Manoncourt, E., Joshi, K., Naqvi, S., Pouye, A., Safi, N., 
Chitnis, K. and Quereshi, S. (2016). 'Social Mobilization and Community Engagement Central to the Ebola 
Response in West Africa: Lessons for Future Public Health Emergencies.' Global Health: Science and Practice 
4.4: 626-646. 
Hewlett, B. S. (2016). 'Evolutionary Cultural Anthropology: Containing Ebola Outbreaks and Explaining Hunter-
Gatherer Childhoods.' Current Anthropology, 57(S13): S27-S37. 
Hewlett, B. S. and Amola, R. P. (2003). 'Cultural Contexts of Ebola in Northern Uganda.' Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 9.10: 1242-1248. 
Hewlett, B. S. and Hewlett, B. L. (2008). Ebola, Culture, And Politics : The Anthropology Of An Emerging Disease. 
Belmont, Calif: Thomson. 
Hulstaert, G. 1961. Les Mongo: aperçu général. Tervuren: Musée royal de l'Afrique Centrale. Archives 
d'ethnographie, 5. P.66. 
IASC (2008). Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency settings. 
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/Checklist%20for%20field%20use%20IASC
%20MHPSS.pdf  
IASC (2015). Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Ebola Virus Disease Outbreaks. A Guide for Public 
Health Programme Planners. 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/emergencies/ebola_programme_planners/en/ 
Kemba, B. (2018). Implication de l’Association de Taximotos de Mbandaka, « ATAMBA »/Equateur-RDC. Dans la 
riposte contre Ebola : Sensibilisation (Note de Briefing)  
Leroy, E.M., Epelboin, A., Mondonge, V., Pourrut, X., Gonzalez, J.P., Muyembe-Tamfum, J.J. and Formenty, P., 
(2009.) Human Ebola outbreak resulting from direct exposure to fruit bats in Luebo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, 2007. Vector-borne and zoonotic diseases, 9(6), pp.723-728. 
Menéndez, C., Lucas, A., Munguambe, K., and Langer, A. (2015). 'Ebola Crisis: The Unequal Impact on Women 
and Children's Health.' The Lancet Global Health, 3.3: e130. 
Oldenburg, S. (2018). Engagement de la jeunesse dans la riposte d’Ebola. Nord Kivu. UNICEF. 
Pagezy, H. 1975. Les interrelations homme-faune de la forêt du Zaïre. In L'Homme et l'Animal, 1er colloque 
d'Ethnozoologie, juin 1975. Paris, Inst. Int. Ethnosciences : 63-88. 
Richards, P. (2016). 'Ebola: How A People's Science Helped End An Epidemic.' 
Richards, P., Amara, J., Ferme, M. C., Kamara, P., Mokuwa, E., Sheriff, A. I., Suluku, R. and Voors, M. (2015). 
'Social Pathways for Ebola Virus Disease in Rural Sierra Leone, and Some Implications for Containment.' PLoS 
Neglected Tropical Diseases 9.4: e0003567. 
Ripoll, S. Gercama, I. Jones, T. Wilkinson, A. (2018). Social Science in Epidemics: Ebola Virus Disease lessons 
learned. Brighton and Oxford: Social Science for Humanitarian Action Platform. 
Samndong, R. A. (2016). 'Institutional Choice and Fragmented Citizenship in Forestry and Development 
Interventions in Bikoro Territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo.' Forum for Development Studies 43.2: 
251-279. 
Sulzmann, E. 1986. Batwa und Baoto, die Symbiose von Wildbeutern und Pflanzern bei den Ekonda und Bolia 
(Zaïre). Sprache und Geschichte in Afrika 7(1): 369-389. 
Unicef (2015). UNICEF Annual Report 2015: Democratic Republic of Congo  
Vansina, J. (1965). Introduction à l'ethnographie du Congo, Bruxelles/Kinsangani. Kinshasa. Lubumbashi 
WHO (2015). Maternal mortality in 1990-2015: Democratic Republic of the Congo. WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, 
World Bank Group, and United Nations Population Division Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-Agency Group 
World Bank (2017). Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births): Estimates developed by the UN Inter-agency 
Group for Child Mortality Estimation ( UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA Population Division ) 
Yong, E. (2018) ‘Most maps of the new Ebola outbreak are wrong.’ Retrieved 1/31/18: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/05/most-maps-of-the-new-ebola-outbreak-are-
wrong/560777/  
 
